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Jury nullification is an inherent and powerful prerogative of 
the American jury, yet it is rarely used. This brief article defends 
the practice of jury nullification as an important lever for 
obtaining justice in our legal system, arguing that juries ought to 
exercise their power to nullify more frequently than they do.  
 
In mounting this defense, this article first outlines the history 
of nullification before presenting some of the traditional 
justifications for its use. It then considers a new model for 
justifying nullification proposed by Professor Paul D. Butler. 
 
In its last two sections, this article examines—and finds 
inadequate—some of the main criticisms levied against juries’ 
power to nullify, before finally offering a simple and elegant 
formulation for determining when nullification is proper. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In an attempt to relate to a colleague the nature of the 
American jury’s relationship to its power of nullification,1 Above 
the Law editor Elie Mystal chose a comic-book metaphor: he 
explained that the jury’s ability to nullify is not a right granted to 
it, but is instead an inherent power, like Wolverine’s adamantium 
claws.2  Now, a close reading of the original text of the Marvel 
comic books would insist that Wolverine’s true inherent power is 
his healing ability—the adamantium in his claws was implanted 
by a mad scientist3—but the metaphor nevertheless paints not 
just a vivid, but an insightful picture.   
The metaphor, in other words, is perhaps not correct, but it is 
nonetheless true.  That description can also be fairly applied to 
decisions made by juries when they exercise their inherent 
nullification powers: the results may not be legally “correct,” at 
least not within a narrow, blind application of the law, but they 
may nevertheless express a deep truth.  This article explores that 
tension in an attempt to investigate the power of an American 
jury to shape society and the law through the use of nullification.  
Particularly, this article considers some arguments against 
nullification and suggests a possible standardizing parameter for 
determining the appropriateness of nullification. 
 
 I.  THE CENTRAL MORAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR NULLIFICATION 
 
Scholars of the subject agree that the concept of jury 
nullification within the Anglo-American legal tradition finds its 
                                                
1 “Jury nullification” is a label applied to the outcome when a jury acquits a 
defendant even though it believes the defendant committed the charged crime. 
Some of the reasons for this sort of acquittal are discussed in detail below. 
2 Radiolab: Null and Void, WNYC STUDIOS (May 12, 2017), 
https://www.wnycstudios.org/story/null-and-void. 
3 See Charles Soule, Death of Wolverine: The Weapon X Program #3 (MARVEL 
COMICS Dec, 2014); Charles Claremont, Wolverine #3 (MARVEL COMICS Nov. 
1982). 
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origin in William Penn’s trial for unlawful assembly in London in 
1670.4  The elements of the charged crime were all present: in 
England at the time, it was a violation of the Conventicle Act of 
1664 to convene a religious assembly not sponsored by the Church 
of England.5  And there was no dispute as to the material facts: 
Penn did not deny that he’d drawn a crowd, nor that he was 
giving a religious speech not sanctioned by the established 
Church.   
Yet Penn urged the jury to find him not guilty—not because 
his actions were legal, but because he claimed the law prohibiting 
them was not.6  After lengthy deliberation, the jurymen returned 
with a verdict of not guilty.7  And though they did not articulate 
the reasoning underlying their opinion, it appears that they 
agreed with Penn’s assessment; after all, the weight of the 
evidence seemed so clearly to lie against a “not guilty” decision 
that the judge in the case held the jury in contempt, fining them 
“forty marks each” for their verdict.8 
 
A. The “Unjust Law” Justification 
 
The origin story here is crucial because the jurors’ decision in 
the trial of William Penn appears to have been guided by a moral 
judgment, rather than a strictly legal one.  It contains a strand of 
argument still found in support of nullification today: juries 
                                                
4 Paul D. Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the 
Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 701 (1995); Simon Stern, Between 
Local Knowledge and National Politics: Debating Rationales for Jury 
Nullification After Bushell's Case, 111 YALE L.J. 1815, 1822 (2002). 
5 Steve Bachmann, Starting Again with the Mayflower . . . England’s Civil 
War and America’s Bill of Rights, 20 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 193, 209 (2000). 
6 JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF 
DEMOCRACY 69 (1994). 
7 See Stern, supra note 4, at 1823. 
8 Id. The Penn trial, with the ensuing jury fines, forms the core of what is 
now known as Bushell’s Case, after one of the jurors who refused to pay his 
fine.  Bushell remained imprisoned until his case reached the Court of Common 
Pleas, where presiding judge John Vaughan ruled that a jury’s decisions could 
be neither dictated nor punished by the trial judge. Id.  
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should refuse to find people guilty of bad laws.  Perhaps the 
leading example of this practice in the United States was the 
refusal of northern juries to find abolitionists guilty of violating 
the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act.9  In those cases, the question was not 
whether the defendants had harbored runaway slaves—they 
had—the question was whether a law that so demeaned human 
dignity as to treat human beings like property ought ever to be 
applied.10  It oughtn’t.  In refusing to convict for violating an 
immoral law, these juries (perhaps unknowingly) carried on the 
tradition begun in the Penn trial some 200 years prior: juries 
found they had the innate power to declare that even though a 
defendant had violated the law, she should not be punished when 
the law itself violated a deeper principle of justice.  
 
B. The “Unjust Application” Justification 
 
The second main moral justification calls for nullification not 
when the law is unjust on its own terms, but when its application 
to the present facts would be unjust.  There is no clear class of 
cases demonstrating this justification; by definition, juries nullify 
under this principle because of the specific circumstances of the 
defendant demand special treatment.    
For example, if a mother broke into her neighbor’s apartment 
to use the telephone that she knew was inside so that she could 
call an ambulance for her deathly sick child, a jury might choose 
not to convict her for the unlawful breaking and entering.  The 
question isn’t whether she broke the law (she did).  But nor is it 
whether the law was an unjust law (it’s not; society benefits by 
prohibiting people from breaking into each other’s homes).  
Instead, the question is whether it would be morally correct to 
strictly apply the law in this particular instance.  And in the case 
of a parent caring for a dying child, a jury may find that the moral 
case for mercy mitigates against punishment, even if the jury is 
convinced the parent committed the crime. 
                                                
9 Abramson, supra note 6, at 80–85. 
10 Id.   
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C. The “Abuse of Power” Justification 
 
The third traditional basis for justifying nullification is in 
instances of government abuse or overreach.  As with the second 
basis, application of this justification is dependent on the specific 
facts of the case.  It is possible that the OJ Simpson verdict 
represents nullification of this type. 11   Possibly, the jurors 
believed that Mr. Simpson had murdered his ex-wife and her 
friend, but were sufficiently angered by the Los Angeles Police 
Department’s (and perhaps particularly by Detective Mark 
Fuhrman’s) racism that they brought a verdict of acquittal as a 
rebuke against a governmental authority that seemed to have 
overstepped its lawful bounds.   
Here, the question is not whether the defendant did it (by his 
own If I Did It account, it certainly appears that he did12), nor is 
the question whether the law against murder is unjust (it is not). 
Nor even is the question whether it is unjust to apply the law 
against murder to this individual defendant in his circumstances 
(at least, no public reasoning of this sort has been proffered).  
Instead, the question here is whether it is just to acquit a 
defendant the jury believes is guilty, in order to signal to the 
government that illegal overreach will not be tolerated by the 
governed.  In some cases, juries appear to decide that it is. 
                                                
11 It is at least equally possible that the jury in that case simply didn’t feel 
that the prosecution had met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Perhaps they were persuaded by Johnnie Cochran’s “if it doesn’t fit, you must 
acquit” line of reasoning. Or perhaps they did feel Simpson was guilty and 
nullified, but for a different reason. 
12 See generally O.J. SIMPSON, IF I DID IT: CONFESSIONS OF THE KILLER 
(Beaufort Books 2007). The book was originally titled only IF I DID IT, but the 
subtitle was added by the Goldman family after ownership of the book’s rights 
was transferred to them as part of the civil judgment against Simpson. Jennifer 
E. Rothman, The Inalienable Right of Publicity, 101 GEO. L.J. 185, 189 n. 19 
(2012).  
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 II.  A NEW MODEL FOR NULLIFICATION 
 
Georgetown Law professor Paul D. Butler propounds a fourth 
moral argument that is similar to the arguments concerning 
unjust laws, unjustly-applied laws, and governmental abuse, but 
with a particular cant: he argues that jurors—and especially black 
jurors—ought to refuse to convict black defendants for some 
nonviolent types of crime.13  Mr. Butler’s argument is that the 
shockingly high incarceration rate for African-Americans relative 
to their proportion of the country’s population gives strong 
evidence of systemic racism in the American justice system,14 and 
that such racism has proven insusceptible to standard channels 
for change.15  Thus, he argues that juries ought not to convict 
black defendants when they commit certain nonviolent crimes,16 
in order to tip the balance in American law toward a more 
equitable distribution of punishment across racial lines.17  As long 
as black Americans are punished at multiple times the rate at 
which white Americans are, nullification provides a necessary 
thumb on the scale. 
The Butler model thus operates as a form of affirmative action, 
but one put in place by those affected by the injustice. Instead of 
the majority attempting to inculcate greater equality, the 
minority procures some measure of equality for itself.  It’s what 
                                                
13 See Butler, supra note 4, at 723–24. 
14 Id. at 697 n.109 (citing U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Economics & Statistics 
Admin., Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the U.S. 1994, at 13 
(1994)) [hereinafter Statistical Abstract of the U.S.]. 
15 Paul D. Butler, Race-Based Jury Nullification: Case-in-Chief, 30 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 911, 922 (1997) (“I do not want to hear that African-
Americans should write to Congress. We tried that. It did not work. The house 
that African-Americans live in is on fire, and when your house is on fire, you do 
not write to Congress. You do not ask the people who set the fire to put it out; 
you leave the building. That is what my proposal for selective jury nullification 
encourages.”). 
16 Butler specifically encourages nullification for black defendants accused of 
drug possession. Id. at 920–21. 
17 See id at 920–22.  
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Butler calls “self-help,” 18  and it is a moral justification for 
nullification in much the same way the above-mentioned “main” 
justifications are.  However, despite the fact that it is a rational, 
moral response to a scientifically-observable problem,19 the Butler 
model is not without its critics. 
  
III.  SOME OF THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST NULLIFICATION 
 
There are legal scholars who oppose the power of juries to 
nullify, some on narrow technical grounds, and others on broader, 
more philosophical justifications. This section considers several 
such arguments as they have been formulated by two prominent 
critics of nullification. 
 
A. The “Technical” Arguments 
 
Illinois College of Law professor Andrew D. Leipold offers a 
sharp criticism both of Butler’s model for nullification in 
particular, and of nullification systems more broadly.20 Leipold 
offers four arguments against nullification, none of them 
particularly persuasive.21 
Leipold’s first argument is what he calls a “technical” one: he 
claims that if the Butler model gains popular support within the 
black community, then the result will be that fewer black people 
will serve on juries.22  According to Leipold, prosecutors would 
strike black potential jurors if those potential jurors admitted 
their predisposition to nullification, and that such strikes would 
                                                
18 Id. at 912–13, 918, 920–21.  
19 As recently as 2014, African Americans were incarcerated at five times 
the rate of white Americans, and comprised 34% of the prison population 
though they made up only 12% of the total population.  See Criminal Justice 
Fact Sheet, NAT’L ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, 
https://www.naacp.org/criminal-justice-fact-sheet/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2018); see 
also Statistical Abstract of the U.S., supra note 13. 
20 Andrew D. Leipold, Race-Based Jury Nullification: Rebuttal, 30 J. MARSHALL 
L. REV. 911, 923–24 (1997). 
21 Id. at 923.  
22 Id. at 923–24. 
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survive a Batson challenge because they would be removals for 
cause.23  This would be Leipold’s strongest argument, except that 
it ignores both the facts of reality and the possibility of civil 
disobedience. 
First, Leipold’s no-black-jurors argument overlooks the fact 
that prosecutors already routinely strike black jurors at an 
“extraordinarily disproportionate rate,” the essentially-
unenforceable ruling in Batson notwithstanding.24  Leipold may 
as well be standing in Greensboro, North Carolina in 1960 and 
cautioning against lunch counter sit-ins, lest lunch counter 
proprietors respond to the protests by failing to serve black 
patrons.  The damage is here, now.  It is already being done, so 
the argument not to attempt a solution so as not to incur damage 
fails as a matter of lived experience and common sense. 
Further, the possibility of civil disobedience on the parts of 
potential black jurors calls the basis of Leipold’s argument here 
into question: prosecutors can only strike potential jurors for 
cause if those jurors admit to their inclination toward 
nullification.  While nullification itself is a legal power of the jury 
and thus not disobedience per se, the refusal to admit to potential 
nullification during voir dire could be an act of civil disobedience 
undertaken by the juror wishing to enact the Butler model.   
It seems highly likely that a prospective juror motivated to use 
her power of nullification in the interest of a greater social good 
would be willing to commit perjury if necessary to hide her 
intentions, in much the same way that lunch counter protesters 
were willing to trespass in the interest of a similar social good 
nearly sixty years earlier.25  Thus, Leipold’s “technical” warning 
against Butler’s model of nullification founders on practical 
ground. 
                                                
23 Id.  
24 Thomas Ward Frampton, The Jim Crow Jury, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1594, 
1621–22 (2018); see  Paul D. Butler, Race-Based Jury Nullification: Case-in-
Chief, 30 J. Marshall L. Rev. 911, 922 (1997).  
25 That the country is still fighting many of the same battles, just on a 
different front, sixty years later may be what Professor Butler meant when he 
said that the African-American house is on fire. See Butler, supra note 14. 
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Leipold’s second “technical” argument similarly fails to survive 
any serious inquiry.  This second argument is that under normal 
circumstances, juries do not have sufficient evidence before them 
to make well-reasoned nullification decisions.26  That is, Leipold 
claims that in order to approach the question of nullification, a 
jury needs to weigh factors that are typically not available to it at 
trial.27 However, this argument is problematic for two reasons. 
First, Leipold’s critique assumes without providing evidence 
that nullification requires extra facts beyond those ordinarily 
available to the jury.  Leipold provides a list of factors he 
considers relevant, but does not provide any reason to believe that 
jurors in fact require answers to the questions he poses.  Neither 
does he show that jurors need additional evidence of any kind to 
nullify, beyond the same evidence they need to decide the facts at 
trial.  Without evidence that a jury actually requires facts not 
normally available to it, this criticism appears circular: why does 
the jury need extra facts to nullify?  Because unless the jury has 
extra facts, it cannot nullify!  But why does the jury need extra 
facts to nullify?  And so on, in perpetuity. . . . 
Second, if Leipold is suggesting that context matters, it seems 
his argument is better-directed at the second traditional 
justification for nullification (the unjustly-applied law) rather 
than at a programmatic approach like the Butler model.  It is 
likely true that the former justification would require an 
understanding of some of the facts of the defendant’s life and 
circumstances.  It is also likely that such facts would ordinarily 
only be admissible if the defendant herself introduced them into 
evidence.  But there Leipold betrays another practical blind spot: 
if there are mitigating personal circumstances in a defendant’s 
case that call for the merciful application of law (such as 
nullification), the defendant is likely to highlight those facts at 
                                                
26 Leipold, supra note 20, at 924. 
27 He lists five such factors: (1) whether the defendant is contrite; (2) the 
existence (and severity) of her criminal record; (3) whether someone else ought 
to be blamed for the crime; (4) the manner of enforcement (e.g., is there a racial 
bias in the way this crime is enforced?), and; (5) what the range of possible or 
likely sentences is.  Id. at 924–25. 
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trial.28  Thus, the problem of Leipold’s argument as it pertains to 
“unjustly-applied law” nullification is that his argument once 
again does not account for the realities of trial practice. 
However, as an attack on the Butler model, Leipold’s second 
technical argument misses the mark completely.  The type of 
nullification Butler advocates does not depend on the individual 
“worthiness” of the defendant; it’s a social solution, aimed at a 
social problem rather than at ascertaining the particular merits of 
any one case.  As such, Butler-type nullification does not require 
any special investigation into the particular circumstance of a 
defendant, so the argument that this kind of nullification cannot 
proceed properly because the jury doesn’t have enough facts is 
simply incoherent. 
Directly or indirectly, that it is okay to engage in an 
uninformed cost-benefit analysis, we have no moral basis for 
complaining about any decision that a jury makes.”29  Well, no.  
This argument is redolent of the foul sophistry of arguments 
against gay marriage (there will be people marrying spoons!),30 
and it fails for the same reason that every slippery-slope 
argument fails: it is derelict in its application of logic.   
In other words, it does not follow logically that by condoning 
certain actions, society must necessarily condone all actions.  Just 
as society can embrace the robust exercise of civil liberties while 
also condemning bestiality, so too can society embrace a measured 
approach to equal justice while also condemning abuses of justice.  
For example, a just treatment of nullification has no problem 
condoning its use for defendants who harbored runaway slaves 
while condemning its abuse in acquitting southern lynch mobs.  
                                                
28 See, e.g., Ayestas v. Davis, 138 S. Ct. 1080, 1086 (2018); Hidalgo v. 
Arizona, 138 S. Ct. 1054, 1054–55 (2018); Trevino v. Davis, 138 S. Ct. 1793, 
1795 (2018).  
29 Leipold, supra note 20, at 925 (emphasis added). 
30 It is impossible to treat these arguments with less respect than they 
deserve. For example, a religious organization calling itself the “Family 
Research Council” managed, po-faced, to compare gay marriage to bestiality 
while naming its pamphlet “The Slippery Slope.” Family Research Council, The 
Slippery Slope of Same-Sex Marriage, (2004), 
https://downloads.frc.org/EF/EF04C51.pdf. 
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Nor does it take one hundred fifty years of hindsight to suss out 
the difference between right and wrong: when the problem is as 
dramatic as seeing one-third of a population in prison at some 
point during their lifetime, 31  a just society may embrace a 
commensurately dramatic solution.  
The last of Leipold’s arguments is aimed directly at Butler-
type nullification.  It is Leipold’s claim that the Butler 
justification for nullification is philosophically suspect because, 
like the racism that produced the problem it seeks to correct, 
Butler’s solution is race-based.  As Leipold puts it, “using race as 
the reason for acquitting or convicting is a bad idea, and no 
matter how strategic the reasoning and no matter how good our 
intentions, it is still wrong.”32   
This is perhaps the most pernicious argument.  It is facially an 
appeal to equal treatment regardless of skin color, which ought to 
be the goal of any democratic system aimed at producing real 
justice.  However, this argument also wilts under critical 
examination, so completely that its surface-level nod at equality 
seems little more than a head fake.  Because under the skin of 
this critique lies the sentiment that courts have “made significant 
progress over the last twenty years,” so that therefore no dramatic 
solution is needed.33 
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. was familiar with this precise line 
of thinking.  He said that this wait, wait admonishment from 
what he called the “white moderate” was “the great stumbling 
block” across the path to equality, writing that the problem he 
found most vexing 
 
. . . is not the White Citizen's Counciler or the Ku 
Klux Klanner, but the white moderate, who is more 
                                                
31 According to a U.S. Department of Justice report from 2001, one-third of 
black men born in 2001 will spend some part of their lives in prison. THOMAS P. 
BONCZAR, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PREVALENCE OF IMPRISONMENT IN 
THE U.S. POPULATION, 1974-2001, at 1 (Aug. 2003), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/piusp01.pdf. 
32 Leipold, supra note 20, at 926. 
33 Id. 
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devoted to "order" than to justice; who prefers a 
negative peace which is the absence of tension to a 
positive peace which is the presence of justice; who 
constantly says: “I agree with you in the goal you 
seek, but I cannot agree with your methods of direct 
action”; who paternalistically believes he can set the 
timetable for another man's freedom; who lives by a 
mythical concept of time and who constantly advises 
the Negro to wait for a “more convenient season.” 
Shallow understanding from people of good will is 
more frustrating than absolute misunderstanding 
from people of ill will.34  
 
Leipold’s admonition that Butler’s self-help is unnecessary 
because the legal system has made “significant progress” sounds 
exactly like the paternalistic timetable set by Dr. King’s 
frustrating white moderates.  It’s a picture painted in a tall tower 
by someone who has never set his white shoes on the street.  It is 
the preference of the absence of tension over the presence of 
justice.  It ought not be tolerated. 
 
B. The “Philosophical” Arguments 
 
But Leipold is not alone in his criticism of nullification.  
Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals Judge Pamela Baschab 
mounts a loosely-structured, loosely-reasoned jeremiad against 
the practice.35   
Judge Baschab’s curious central argument is that by 
nullifying, jurors are “tak[ing] the law into their own hands.”36  As 
though that were somehow wrong.  As though the jurors had 
actually taken anything.  As though the law were not delivered, 
ceremoniously, into their hands at the moment they were charged 
                                                
34 Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from a Birmingham Jail (Apr. 16, 1963), 
https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/Letter_Birmingham.html.  
35 Judge Pamela Baschab, Jury Nullification: The Anti-Atticus, 65 ALA. LAW. 
110, 112 (2004). 
36 Id.  
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to apply that law to the facts.  This “taking the law into their own 
hands” argument fails on three grounds: it is incoherent, it is 
inconsistent with Judge Baschab’s own writing within the same 
article, and it ignores the fact that the jury decisions Judge 
Baschab decries may be not only permissible but necessary to the 
interests of justice. 
 Judge Baschab complains that in criminal cases “the 
unwise decision of the jury is final, cannot be reviewed, does not 
have to be explained or defended, and provides no recourse for the 
state or victims,” before asking, with a rhetorical flourish, “How 
fair is that?”37  To which surely every thinking reader responds, 
“Why, perfectly.  It is perfectly fair, and moreover, it is the very 
core, the bedrock fundamental principle of our country’s judicial 
system, that in a jury trial the jury decides the case.  To allow 
otherwise would be to upend the very foundation upon which our 
system of law is built!”   
The argument that juries should not “take the law into their 
own hands” is therefore incoherent.  “Taking the law into their 
own hands” is precisely what jurors are supposed to do.  It is what 
they are literally instructed to do; typical jury instructions include 
the phrase “your job is to apply the law to the facts.”  Thus, jurors 
are specifically requested to decide whether the law applies to the 
case before them.   
Nullification, likewise, is a decision about whether the law 
should apply in the present case.  It is senseless to claim that a 
decision made for one type of reason is acceptable, but that the 
same decision made for a different type of reason is unacceptable.  
Whether the justification for acquittal is formulated as “following 
the law” or as “nullifying the law,” the actual work done is the 
same: jurors are tasked with deciding whether the law applies to 
the facts of a given case. 
Yet Judge Baschab compounds this error of reasoning by 
introducing a particular inconsistency.  Early in her article she 
writes that her “stock answer” to the question of whether a jury 
made the right decision is to say, “whatever verdict [you] rendered 
                                                
37 Id. at 113. 
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is the truth and is correct by definition.”38  Yet the astute reader 
will note that this proclamation comes just one page before her 
characterization of some jury decisions as “unwise.”39   
How can it be that whatever verdict the jury returns is both 
true and correct, but also at the same time unwise?  The 
inconsistency here may be part and parcel of the failure to accord 
to the jury the same measure of autonomous judgment Judge 
Baschab reserves to the prosecutor. That discrepancy is the third 
failure of her argument. 
On the one hand, Judge Baschab decries the nullification 
decision when rendered by the jury.  But on the other, she writes 
approvingly of the prosecutor’s discretion in deciding which 
potential defendants to prosecute.40  But the prosecutor’s decision 
whether or not to charge a person is perfectly parallel to the jury’s 
decision to nullify; in both instances, the question is whether the 
defendant (or potential defendant) ought to be punished for the 
crime.   
To accord that power to the prosecutor while denying it to the 
jury is to preference institutional authority over the democratic 
process.  It is to say that it’s better to have one person in a 
position of power than to have twelve.  Given—for just one 
example—the fact that prosecutors charge black defendants at 
five times the rate they charge white defendants, the interests of 
justice require that the jury be able to function as a 
counterbalance.  To discourage nullification in the face of 
prosecutorial discretion is to argue for an imbalanced system. 
Having thus considered and disposed of several arguments 
against nullification, it is appropriate now to turn to the question 
of how to determine when nullification is proper. 
  
IV.  A METHOD FOR DETERMINING THE PERMISSIBILITY OF JURY 
NULLIFICATION 
 
                                                
38 Id. at 111. 
39 Id. at 113. 
40 Id. 
  
16 
There is a deep philosophical underpinning to the American 
system of jurisprudence.  It is woven into the fabric of the 
American trial,41 and it recurs in attempts to codify the common 
law and to promulgate black-letter rules.  It is, of course, the 
belief in justice, as both goal and arbiter.  At its heart, the 
American system is devoted to the quest for justice.42  At the same 
time, the concept is invoked as a weighing method.43  Given its 
special prominence in justifying the business of the courts and its 
utility in guiding the courts’ decisions, the question of required 
justice is surely adequate to the task of determining the propriety 
of nullification, too. 
The rule needn’t be overly complex.  Juries should nullify when 
justice so requires.  By invoking the same rule underlying the 
courts’ actions, it is possible to account for all four of the main 
moral justifications considered above, as well as to rebut all the 
arguments against nullification considered above.  Antebellum 
juries were correct to nullify in Fugitive Slave Act cases: justice 
required it.  A jury should nullify in the case of the parent who 
breaks and enters in order to save her dying child: justice requires 
it.  The OJ Simpson jury was within its proper bounds to rebuke 
the racist overreach of the police via nullification: justice required 
it.  And juries attempting to balance the scales of justice by 
refusing to convict nonviolent black defendants while those 
defendants are charged at multiple times the rates of white 
defendants are practically obligated by this rule to do so, for 
justice requires it. 
The health of the American legal system depends on the notion 
that twelve ordinary people are capable of applying the law to the 
facts and returning a just verdict.  It is therefore not a bridge too 
                                                
41 It is also, without special comment until now, woven into the fabric of this 
article. 
42 Consider, for example, the phrase “Equal Justice Under Law” and its 
placement at the very entrance to the nation’s highest court. 
43 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2) (“The court should freely give leave [to 
amend a pleading] when justice so requires”) (emphasis added); FED. R. EVID. 
104(c)(3) (“The court must conduct any hearing on a preliminary question so 
that the jury cannot hear it if . . . justice so requires”) (emphasis added).  
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far to suggest that those same twelve people are also able to 
determine when and whether justice requires a particular 
decision.  Every pattern jury instruction should therefore come 
with the clear proviso that the jury’s job is to apply the law to the 
facts and then come to whatever decision it determines is required 
by justice.  Such a proviso would clarify the jury’s proper role, 
bring it into alignment with the goals and methods of the rest of 
the justice system, and begin to address the rampant racial 
inequality Professor Butler and others seek to remedy.   
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Jury nullification is an inherent power of the jury, born of the 
very foundational substance of the body itself. It is not granted to 
juries by statute nor by accident of history; instead, it is a power 
imbued in the jury by its very nature.  
When deciding when and whether they ought to nullify, juries 
can use a simple, sturdy framework that has served our legal 
system well in numerous other contexts: juries ought to nullify 
when justice so requires. 
Because the power to nullify is intrinsic to the jury, and 
because its exercise has the potential to fight systemic injustice in 
a way few other mechanisms can, juries ought to use their power 
of nullification rather than let this important mechanism for 
administering justice be wasted through disuse.  
In the present state of the system, it isn’t only a good idea: 
justice requires it. 
 
